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Abstract
One of the most important tasks of national security in modern conditions is to ensure the security and stable functioning
of critical infrastructure of the state. Control systems are an integral and most vulnerable part of critical infrastructure
facilities. This determines the importance of ensuring they are protected from destructive cyber actions. Destructive
cyber actions in it is accompanied, as a rule, by chain effects and synergistic effects that systematically influence and
cover all other spheres of the life of society and the state, both in ordinary and, especially, in critical conditions. The
authors systematically and comprehensively analyzed and presented in the article the results of investigations of the
features of destructive cyber actions in the critical infrastructure of state, counteracting them and protecting from them.
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Introduction
In high tech conflicts of any intensity, hostilities (oper-
ations) and other (non-force) actions, mainly economic,
political, diplomatic, informational, psychological, cy-
ber, cognitive, etc. [1], are mutually coordinated accord-
ing to a single plan. The impacts are felt on all spheres
of life, on all sectors of society and throughout the state.
Thanks to the use of innovative technologies, it be-
came possible to shift conflict from predominantly overt
and forceful (kinetic) means [2], to less obvious strate-
gies focused on the structural vulnerabilities critical
infrastructure and society of adversaries in cyberspace.
What are often missed are the broader strategic goals
of an adversary in undertaking a modern war cam-
paign, and the broad spectrum of tools used to achieve
those goals. The purpose of this article is to illustrate
and explain the use of cyber weapons against critical
infrastructure of the state.
The targeting of critical infrastructure is an effective
way to increase vulnerability of a state or society, while
signaling to other potential adversaries their own vul-
nerabilities and the potential to cripple large sectors
of the economy. Cyber tools provide an asymmetric
advantage without regard to geographic distance, mean-
ing small groups can inflict widespread damage while
avoiding normal attribution and rules of deterrence [3].
Critical infrastructure and cyber attacks are a useful
place to start because of the existing history of attacks,
and the similarities shared between states in their need
to protect the critical infrastructures control system,
and their vulnerabilities to cyber tools.
In modern conditions, these opportunities are used
with high efficiency to achieve various goals by both
state and non-state actors. The Stuxnet worm (possi-
bly attributed to Israel and the US), was effective at
inflicting physical damage on nuclear fuel centrifuges
not connected to any outside network and regarded
by the Iranians as safe from outside interference or at-
tack [4]. Stuxnet was an elegant piece of programming
that could easily move from computer to computer
without detection, not harming or interfering in any
system until it finally found its way to specific computer-
controlled centrifuges in Iran. Once there, the worm
would make slight changes to the operation of the high-
speed machines, shifting the calibration just enough to
damage or destroy them, without raising suspicion that
an outside attack was occurring. Likewise, China and
even smaller powers such as North Korea possess anti-
infrastructures cyber capabilities, and non-state actors
such as Al Qaeda and ISIS have also exhibited notable
cyber-attack capabilities against critical infrastructure
[5].
Features of protecting the critical infras-
tructure of the state from destructive cy-
ber impact in modern conditions
As Conklin and Kohnke wrote, much of cyber security
has been built around the concept of ‘walling off’ com-
puter systems to outside intruders, and protecting data
rather than focusing on the resilience of the system as a
whole. Their argument was to focus more on functional-
ity than individual attacks, a focus that already exists
in the critical state infrastructure, for example, energy
sector but indicates a mismatch between energy security
and the vulnerabilities present in infrastructure from
cyber-related systems [6]. We will consider the features
of protecting the critical infrastructure of a state from
destructive cyber impact in modern conditions using
the energy sector as an example, since energy security
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from cyber-attacks is based on a broader concept of
sustainability, which is associated not only with the
actual production and transmission of energy, but for
those systems that have energy supports and legitimizes.
Remove energy from a society, particularly highly in-
dustrialized and technology-dependent countries, and it
is pulling the proverbial rug out from under all support
systems.
Resilience networks can be modeled according to the
type and pattern of connections (topology) between dif-
ferent parts of the system, whether these are individuals,
electrical connections, or ecological relationships. Since
network connections are functional, they are rarely ran-
dom, and instead center on critical nodes which provide
crucial links within the system. In ecological sciences,
these critical nodes are often referred to as “keystone
species,” which even if they are not the most visible
representatives of an ecosystem, are crucial to its ef-
fective functioning. In social systems, these critical
nodes may be key individuals or centers of community
activity, which provide a focus in connection between
people who otherwise may not interact. And with the
Internet, critical nodes are either the more visible cen-
ters of activity such as Google, or can be represented
in terms of key servers or communication lines. In all
of the above cases, however, these networks are often
known as “scale free,” meaning they tend to be resilient
because random failures at any part in the system can
be compensated for [7].
Energy networks are often configured differently, as
instead of being resilient and allowing for rerouting
of power in the case of failure; traditional energy in-
frastructure has been constructed on centralized nodes.
The pattern of energy infrastructure from the twentieth
century was one of large power plants (either fossil or
nuclear fueled), which then transmit electricity to pop-
ulation centers, with corresponding subnetworks of elec-
trical transformers [8]. Much of the work on increasing
resilience of energy systems has focused on preventing
cascading failures in electrical networks, where failure
of a few critical nodes propagates blackouts over large
geographic areas, as witnessed numerous times in North
America. This was a form of resilience, but one coupled
with aspects of fragility, meaning the system was brittle
and could easily be broken with enough external force.
The experience of Puerto Rico in the wake of Hurricane
Maria in 2017 has been an unfortunate case in point
[9]. Civilian resilience for the energy sector focus less
on the power plants themselves, although increasingly
environmental factors have overwhelmed the ability of
large power plants to withstand flooding and other en-
vironmental hazards. While the Fukushima disaster in
2011 was the most visible example, increasingly energy
utilities in North America and Europe have become
more vulnerable [10].
Social, political, and energy networks do not operate
independently, but are instead “nested” in one another.
Highly resilient social and political bonds are based on
activities that cannot operate for long without more
fundamental energy and environmental networks. This
leaves even the healthiest of social networks vulnerable
should supporting energy networks be compromised. As
a basic need, utilities such as energy, water, and sewage
reflect upon the legitimacy of governing powers, and
trust in these institutions quickly weakens when basic
services cannot be met. In Kosovo, for example, despite
high public trust in security provided by NATO/KFOR
in the country, the electrical utilities KEK and KEDS
are publicly maligned and distrusted, and although
privatized still negatively and severely affect public per-
ceptions of government legitimacy and trust in security
[11]. In Iraq, US armed forces carried out research that
indicated those areas of Baghdad (particularly Sadr
City) where insurgents had cut access to water, electric-
ity, and sewage, were highly correlated with support for
the insurgency [12]. Sparking instability with basic ser-
vices can be an effective and deniable way to undermine
a society and leaving it more vulnerable. For countries
such as Ukraine, with its traumatic experience of the
Chernobyl disaster in 1986, the links between energy
security and government legitimacy may be even more
fragile.
The use of information and cyber tech-
nologies for destructive actions in the
energy sector in modern high-tech wars
(hybrid wars, conflicts)
Modern society almost completely depends on the
state of security of information and cyber-infrastructure
in all spheres of human activity. Not only government
structures of states, but also criminal and terrorist or-
ganizations have the opportunity to use information
and cyber technologies, information and communica-
tion networks to achieve their goals. It provoked the
provision of cyber and information security of critical in-
frastructure of the state became a critical condition for
ensuring the state’s defense capability, its economic and
social development. The destructive geopolitical actors
(DGAs - the destructive geopolitical actors are states,
terrorist organizations or groups of people conducting
attacks against national security of the state) have been
willingly and diverse to use the cyberspace of Ukraine
as a cyber art theater and a cyber weapons‘ testing
ground. In many cases, cyberattacks were aimed at
the Ukrainian electricity distribution system, disabling
for a long time objects of economy, infrastructure and
housing.
The deep penetration of energy in all sectors of the
economy and in the social sphere determines its special
role in ensuring the security of modern society devel-
opment. Energy security characterizes the degree of
energy (power) complex performance of its functions to
society, the state in ordinary, critical and extraordinary
circumstances [13]. Enterprises and institutions of the
energy sector play a leading role in the development
of the state [14]. Industry remains the main consumer
of electricity, although its share in total electricity con-
sumption in the world is decreasing. Electricity in
industry is used to activate various mechanisms and
directly technological processes. Nowadays the coeffi-
cient of electrification of the power drive in the industry
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is 80%. In this case, about 1/3 of electricity is spent
directly on technological needs [15]. The objects of the
energy sector are strategically important objects and
must function continuously and qualitatively [16].
On the territory of Ukraine, in each region there are
energy structures that belong to the critical infrastruc-
ture. Each of them possesses so-called "critical nodes",
which when disrupted lead to a breakdown in network
functionality and potentially spark cascading failures
across networks.
The energy structural elements all relate to a cer-
tain hierarchy, control system and security system.
The basis of electricity is the united power system
of Ukraine, which centralizes the supply of electric-
ity to domestic consumers, as well as its exports and
imports. The system combines 8 regional power sys-
tems (Dniprovska, Donbas, Western, Crimean, South-
ern, Southwest, Northern, Central), interconnected by
system-generating and interstate high-voltage transmis-
sion lines. According to the State Statistics Committee
of Ukraine, the largest share of electricity is produced
in thermal power plants - about 50%, at NPPs (nuclear
power plants) - 45%, and in hydroelectric plants - 5%.
Threats in the Energy Sector
The whole set of threats that can affect the function-
ing of power systems can be conventionally divided into
ordinary threats (probable failures and accidents) and
extraordinary (unique due to the origin, nature of devel-
opment and consequences). Various forms of reserving
capacities, the development and transportation of fuel
and energy resources, systems of guaranteed energy
supply and the creation of reserves of fuel and energy
resources serve to counteract unusual threats in power
systems. Such ordinary phenomena almost exclude
threats to energy security in conditions of development
and functioning of national economy. In contrast, un-
usual effects can negatively affect the energy complex
as a whole. Among the extraordinary threats, the cyber
threats play a leading role. Cyber threats are able to
provoke such problems as the violation of the provision
of energy resources and emergency situations in the
power complex of the state. They are implemented in
the form of a variety of destructive cyber effects.
Destructive Cyber Effects can be
– Targeted attacks (Advanced Persistent Threat);
– Effect on control systems;
– Effect through social networks;
– Attacks on banking systems (theft of money);
– Hardware bugs (instrument bugs) in chips and
firmware of computer and network equipment.
Such cyber threats can be realized by influencing
both the entire all critical infrastructure of the state
as a whole and its individual elements separately, as
well as with the achievement of synergy of the results.
The impact can be carried in a complex, simultaneously,
sequentially or mixed on an automated control system,
personnel, on the financial system, on the hardware and
software complex. The most vulnerable place in the ob-
jects of critical infrastructure of the state is automated
control systems.
Analysis of Cyber Effects on Objects of
Critical Infrastructure of the Energy Sec-
tor
The problem of cyber security of state energy sector
is crucial for national security and defense, economic
and social development.
In 2014-2018 well-planned synchronized cyber effects
were conducted on objects of Power Complex different
states of the World. It gave the opportunity of control
to violators for some period of time, and in some cases
even of destruction of management and normal func-
tioning of elements of Power Complexes. The possible
goal of these attacks could be check of cyber security
system reliability of state critical infrastructure and pe-
culiarities of cyber security system functioning of power
companies and their reactions to different cyber effects
and incidents. It was shown that too complex control
over information systems make objects of critical infras-
tructure of the state vulnerable for cyber-attacks. The
most dangerous cyber effects on objects of critical in-
frastructure of the state are those, which provoke or are
accompanied by destructive chain effects as directly on
power object so and on connected with them objects of
other objects of infrastructure and everyday life spheres
of the state.
One more peculiarity of the cyber-attack on objects of
Power Complex different states was the initial dispersion
with final direction on defined systematic multispectral
result and diverse effects.
During the analysis of cyber-attacks, it was found
that the attacks were not solitary, but were conducted
synchronously. All of them had a destructive effect
on the control system of energy objects. The main
synchronous destructive cyber effect was focused on
the vulnerable elements of control systems. Before
the main cyberattack, a preliminary cyberattack was
conducted on the system of service and dispatching
with the purpose of denial in service of consumers.
For example in Ukraine the use of several destructive
concentrated cyber-attacks on the power complex was
carried out within the framework of a large-scale cyber
operation aimed at violating simultaneously several
objects of the power complex of Ukraine.
The groups responsible for many of the Ukrainian
cyber-attacks, Telebots, Black Energy and Grey En-
ergy, have been closely or more loosely linked with the
intelligence agencies of the destructive geopolitical ac-
tors [17]. The lack of any direct attribution, however,
does not diminish the strategic use of such tools to
destabilize and delegitimize the Ukrainian state. On
the contrary, such maskirovka approaches to conflict
are prime examples of how cyber tools can be used in
modern conceptions of hybrid warfare, where vulnera-
bilities of critical infrastructure are attacked in order
to weaken state support and function, and increase
distrust by potential outside partners. A secondary
goal of cyber-attacks on energy infrastructure may be
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to signal to others (e.g. UK, US, Germany) their own
vulnerabilities, where Ukrainian attacks serve as proofs
of concept. In either case, the activities of cyber at-
tackers are highly coordinated, difficult to trace and
attribute, and are highly asymmetrical, non-kinetic at-
tacks. These attacks represent newly technical areas of
conflict, particularly in cases where an unending state
of instability is the goal, rather than the traditional
concept of ‘total victory’ on the battlefield.
The control system is the most important components
of the any power system. The control system of the
power system plays a leading role in the functioning
of the entire energy (power) complex of any state. A
powerful cyber effect can be executed on the automated
control system, which may lead to a violation of the
control of a particular object of energy or the power
complex as a whole. The automated control system of
the power system should be resilient to cyber effects
and have corresponding Complex Counteract System
against cyber-attacks.
In December 2015, the Advanced Persistent Threat
("Advanced Persistent Threat") was fixed to an au-
tomated control system of power system. The inter-
nal networks of the Ukrainian power company PJSC
"PrykarpattyaOblenergo" were attacked [18]. As a re-
sult of the cyber-attack, for several hours a large part
of the region and the regional center remained with-
out power supply. Thirty substations were shut down.
About 230 thousand people were deprived of energy
supply within one to six hours. During the attack,
the malicious software Black Energy was applied [19].
The Black Energy group launched an attack on the
Ukrainian power grid using the Black Energy and Kill
Disk families. This was the latest known use of Black
Energy malware in the real world. After the attack,
the Black Energy group is divided into at least two
subgroups: TeleBots and Gray Energy.
The main goal of the TeleBots group is to imple-
ment cyberattacks for sabotage in Ukraine, which is
achieved through attacks on computer networks (CNA).
The group has committed many devastating attacks,
including:
• A series of attacks in December 2016 using an up-
dated version of the same malicious Kill Disk soft-
ware developed for Windows and Linux operating
systems.
• A known Petya / NotPetya attack in June 2017
with a backdoors built into the MEDOC Ukrainian
accounting program.
• An attack using the BadRabbit family in October
2017.
ESET specialists had been tracking the activity of
the Grey Energy group for several years. The Grey En-
ergy group uses a unique family of malware called Grey
Energy. The design and architecture of this malicious
software is very similar to the already known Black En-
ergy family. In addition to the conceptual similarities
of the malicious software, links point to the fact that
the group behind the malicious software Grey Energy,
closely cooperates with the group Tele Bots. In particu-
lar, the Grey Energy team developed a worm similar to
NotPetya in December 2016, and later, an even more
advanced version of this malicious program was used by
the Tele Bots group during an attack in June 2017. It is
worth noting that the Greenery group has broader goals
than the Tele Bots group. Grey Energy is primarily
of interest to the industrial networks of various critical
infrastructure organizations, and unlike Tele Bots, the
GreyEnergy group is not limited to Ukraine alone.
At the end of 2015, ESET specialists first spotted
the malware GreyEnergy aimed at a power company in
Poland. But later, as with Black Energy and TeleBots,
the focus of the Grey Energy group was on Ukraine. The
attackers first showed interest in the energy sector, and
then to transport infrastructure and other important
goals. The latest use of malware in GreyEnergy was
reported in mid-2018.
The GreyEnergy malware is modular, and unlike
Industroyer, ESET specialists have not detected any
ICS-driven module, meaning targeted specifically for
industrial control systems, yet such system can still
be targeted using other methods. At least one case
has been detected by the operators of this malicious
software deployment. The module can clear the disk
to disrupt business processes in the company and hide
traces [20]. One of the most striking details revealed
during the ESET study is that one of the detected
samples of GreyEnergy was signed by a valid digital
certificate, which was probably stolen from a Taiwanese
company that manufactures ICS equipment. In other
words, the GreyEnergy group literally followed Stuxnet
development methods.
Moreover, synchronous attacks were carried out
on power companies "Chernivtsioblenergo" and
"Kyivoblenergo", but with lesser consequences. On
December 23, 2015, unauthorized interference with the
information technology system of remote access to tele-
control over equipment of substations of 35-110 kV
PJSC "Kyivoblenergo" was carried out by an unautho-
rized group of people. From 15:31 to 16:30 local time,
fifteen cities, towns and villages were completely or par-
tially blacked out in Myronivsky, Makariv, Bila Tserkva,
Fastovsky, Skvira, Rokitnyansky, Kaharlyk, Ivankivskyi
and Yagotyn administrative districts. There were over
80,000 consumers without electricity. As a result of
the attack there were failures in the system of remote
access, 30 tie-stations were disconnected, which supply
several strategic objects of the region: enterprises, insti-
tutions, organizations and the population. Electricity
was restored at 18:56 on December23, 2015 [21].
The control system was vulnerable to cyber-attacks
of this kind. The response to such a cyber-attack was
not timely, and the security system failed to fulfill its
functions. With malicious software, a cyber-attacker
can control, and in certain applications, manage a part
or whole automated control system. The consequences
of such an attack may have been carried out in order
to verify the functioning of the security system and the
response system to the critical situation of the power
company.
In general, the cyber-attack was comprehensive, and
to a certain extent systemically organized, namely:
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– Preliminary infection of networks with the help of
counterfeit emails;
– Capture control over the automated control system
by executing shut down of operations at substa-
tions;
– Failure of the elements of the automated control
system;
– Deleting information on servers and workstations
(Kill Disk utility);
– Attack on the telephone network of call centers,
in order to ensure the failure to service current
subscribers.
During the period from January 19-20, 2016, a cyber-
attack was conducted with the help of the cyber tool
JCATS (Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation En-
hancements), which was also aimed at disrupting the
control system by installing malicious software that is
sent by e-mail [22]. Another cyberattack, which was
carried out at night from December 17 to December 18,
2016, was less scale-for-effect. The substation "Sever-
naya" of the power company "Ukrenergo" was disrupted.
Consumers of the northern part of the city of Kyiv and
the surrounding areas remained without electricity. The
attackers did not cause significant damage, the purpose
of the attack was "demonstration of force". As in previ-
ous cases, this attack was a part of an operation against
state institutions of Ukraine [23].
The main features of Advanced Persistent Threats
are the following:
– As a rule, they are targeted at elements of critical
infrastructure;
– Conducted by a group of highly skilled hackers;
– Carefully masked using specially designed software
tools (specialized Shell Codes, Root Kitta, etc.);
– Remain unknown for a long time;
– Reinforced by intelligence or destructive actions.
APT are elements of intelligence and subversive
operations.
The main cyberattacks differ in effects and way of
operating. The attacks that were carried out in 2015 on
energy companies were not fully self-organized. In 2016,
malware already foresaw self-organization of actions in
the process of attacks and actions became more opera-
tional. Also, experts from the company ESET, having
conducted the research, stated that "Crash Override" is
capable of physical destruction of power systems. Crash
Override software [24] has the ability to send commands
to the power grid to enable or disable power supply.
According to their data, Crash Override can use the
known vulnerability of Siemens equipment, in particu-
lar, the digital relay Siprotec. Such relays are installed
for the protection, control and control over distribution
and power supply networks. Mike Assante, from the
American cyber security company SANS Institute, has
determined that disconnection of the digital relay can
lead to thermal overload of the power grid. This is a
very serious threat to transformers and equipment that
is under voltage. Thus, Crash Override can provide a
planned attack on several "critical nodes" of the power
complex. Then there is a probability of a power cut-off
on the entire state, as the load moves from one region
to another.
Automated power systems of power complexes are
vulnerable to cyber-attacks. As a result of our anal-
ysis of the cyber-attacks we can separate individual
categories of possible cyber-attacks:
– Target components: electronic computing devices
such as Remote Terminals (RTUs) or the Human
Machine Interface (HMI) [25] typically have an
interface for remote setup or control. Through
remote access, the attacker can intercept device
control and cause malfunctions, e.g. make changes
in the data transmitted to the operator, damage
the equipment, complete or partial failure of the
device.
– Protocols aimed at: nearly all modern data transfer
protocols are well documented and their description
is open source. For example, the DNP3 standard is
common in North American energy control systems
[26]. Its specification is available to anyone who
wants a low price. An attacker can make changes
to information that can lead to significant financial
costs due to overproduction of electricity, switching
on the power line during work on them, damage
to the equipment, overloading the system.
On June 27, 2017, a large-scale destructive hacker
attack ("Petya") was carried out on Ukrainian institu-
tions and organizations. The "critical nodes" of the
energy industry (Ukrenergo, Kievoblenergo, Dniproen-
ergo, Zaporizhzhiaoblenergo, and Chernobyl Nuclear
Power Station) also came under direct attack. The
cyber-attack was aimed at violating the work of com-
pany web sites and the customer support systems. The
damage to the information systems of Ukrainian compa-
nies was due to the updating of the software intended for
reporting and document circulation - M.E.Doc. That is
the installation of a backdoor in the M.E.Doc software
update package. Simultaneously with the installation
of the update package on the computers of the insti-
tutions and organizations, a backdoor was installed,
which further promoted the installation of the virus
"Petya".
On May 23, 2018, Cisco experts warned about the
infection of more than 500,000 routers and systems in
54 countries, but the main goal for large-scale cyber-
attacks could have been Ukraine [27]. The destructive
software "VPN Filter" can be used to conduct such an
attack, which allows attackers to intercept all traffic
passing through the affected device (including autho-
rization data and personal data of payment systems),
collect and unload information, remotely control an
infected device, and even make it out of order. There
are also features for monitoring the Modbus SCADA
protocols used in automated control systems.
All known cyber-attacks that have affected the func-
tioning of critical infrastructure objects in the energy
sector have been assessed in the preceding sections.
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Conclusions
The article considers ways and directions for the
choice and implementation of rational approaches in
solving the complex protection from destructive cy-
ber effects of the state power complex. All major cy-
berattacks carried out at Ukraine Power Complex in
2014-2018 have been analyzed, which influenced the
functioning of the objects of critical infrastructure. It
was found that the cyberattacks were not solitary, but
were conducted systematically. They had a complex de-
structive effect on energy management systems. It was
established that the main destructive cyber effects were
concentrated on the vulnerable elements (critical nodes)
of the control systems of power complex objects. Before
the main cyberattack, a cyber-attack was conducted
on the system of maintenance and dispatching, with
the purpose of refusing to serve the consumers. The
use of several destructive concentrated cyber-attacks
on the power complex was carried out within the frame-
work of a large-scale cyberattack, which was aimed at
simultaneously violating several objects of the energy
industry.
It is established that critical infrastructure of the
state depends on the level of cyber resistance of power
objects. An analysis of cyber-attacks has shown that
the minimum value of the level of stability can lead to
the destruction of the power system (object, network).
The methods of realization of hybrid distributed cu-
mulative cyberattacks with a chain effect on objects of
critical infrastructure are described. The vulnerabilities
of these objects are determined. It was established that
cyberattacks, which were carried out through e-mail,
provided access to the main servers to receive infor-
mation about the state of the system’s operation, to
intercept the management of objects of the critical in-
frastructure of the state as a whole, and then to change
the parameters of their functioning.
The authors developed a technique for detecting hy-
brid distributed-concentrated cyberattacks with chain
effects using a model for intelligent recognition of cy-
ber threats. They designed as well the organizational
and technical measures to ensure cybersecurity in the
critical infrastructure of the state. It has been shown
that systematic measures aimed at timely detection
of cyber threats, preventing and counteracting cyber-
attacks, will provide the necessary level of functional
stability of critical infrastructure systems to destructive
cyber effects. It will ensure their adequate respond to
actual and potential threats, rationally using existing
capabilities and resources of the state.
Aspects of cybernetic destructive actions in modern
wars and armed conflicts are investigated on the basis
of the analysis of the features of the hybrid war. It is
substantiated that the provision of effective counterac-
tion to destructive cybernetic influences requires the
availability of cyber range. Definitions, principles and
concept of construction of a complex cyber range for the
study of hybrid cyber actions are proposed, as well as a
list of problems to be solved to create a complex cyber
range. The questions of methodology and applied as-
pects of creation and application of complex cyber range
are considered. The basic structure and procedure for
the practical creation and use of a comprehensive cyber
range are presented.
Formation of the requirements for the structure and
content of databases and knowledge bases of the pro-
posed cyber range based on the results of its practical
application and research of functioning during the spec-
ified tasks activities.
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